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Abstract
This paper is a follow-up to [4]. We give a strenghtening of the main
result on the semantical non-conservativity of the theory of PT− with in-
ternal induction for total formulae (PT− + INT(tot)). We show that if to
PT− the axiom of internal induction for all arithmetical formulae is added
(PT−+ INT), then this theory is semantically stronger than PT−+ INT(tot).
In particular the latter is not relatively truth definable (in the sense of [9])
in the former. Last but not least we provide an axiomatic theory of truth
which meets the requirements put forward by Fischer and Horsten in [8].
1 Introduction
1.1 Axiomatic Theories of Truth
Axiomatic theories of truth is a branch of mathematical logic and philosophy
which studies the properties of formal theories generated in the following way:
1. We take a base theory B which we demand to be sufficiently strong to
(strongly) represent basic syntactical operations.
2. We extend the language of B by adding one new unary predicate T and
some axioms for it so that the resulting theory Th prove all sentences of
the form
T (pφq) ≡ φ
for φ in the language of our base theory B.
For a brief introduction to the subject see [11] and for a more complete one—
[10]. The big question that this paper answers in a tiny part is the following:
how various axioms for the truth predicate influence its strength. For the pur-
pose of investigating this question we focus on the truth theories with Peano
Arithmetic as a base theory. The notion of strength may enjoy many different
1
explications. For example, the simplest one is given by inclusion of sets of con-
sequences: we might say that Th1 is not weaker than Th2 if and only if Th1
proves all the axioms of Th2. For many applications this is too fine-grained:
many theories, intuitively differing in strength, become incomparable out of
not-that-important reasons (obviously this is not a formal notion). Better ad-
justed notion was introduced by Kentaro Fujimoto in [9] and is a special kind
of interpretability. We recall the definition:
Definition 1. 1. Let Th1 and Th2 be axiomatic truth theories and let TΘ2 be
the truth predicate of Th2. For any sentence Θ of LTh2 and a formula
φ(x) ∈ LTh1 with precisely one free variable let
Θφ(x)
denote the LTh1 sentence which results from Θ by substituting φ(x) for
every occurrence TTh2(x) (and renaming variables, if necessary).
2. We say that Th1 relatively truth defines Th2 if and only if there exists a for-
mula φ(x) ∈ LTh1 such that for any axiom Θ of Th2
Th1 ⊢ Θ
φ(x)
If Th2 relatively truth defines Th1 we will denote it by Th1 ≤F Th21.
In terms of interpretations, relative truth definability is a LPA-conservative
interpretation between truth theories (for the terminology related to interpre-
tations see e.g. [?]). It was argued in [9] that relative truth definability provides
a good explication of epistemological reduction between truth theories. We may
treat it as an explication of a notion of strength: Th1 is Fujimoto-stronger than Th2
if and only if Th1 relatively truth defines Th2 but not vice versa. This relationwill
be denoted by F .
1.2 Strength relative to PA
In some philosophical debates, especially the ones related to the deflationism,
the need for adifferently oriented formal explication of strength seems to emerge.
It has been claimed (most importantly in [16], [15] and [12]) that deflationary
thesis that truth is a "simple" (aka "light", "metaphysically thin") notion implies
that the deflationary theory of truth should be conservative over PA.2 Let us
recall that a theory of truth can be conservative over PA in two senses:
Definition 2. Let Th be a theory of truth.
1”F ” stands for ”Fujimoto.”
2This thesis however has been recently criticised at length in [2]
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1. We say that Th is proof-theoretically conservative over PA if and only if for
every φ ∈ LPA, if Th ⊢ φ, then PA ⊢ φ.3.
2. We say that Th ismodel-theoretically conservative over PA if and only if every
modelM of PA admits an expansion to a model of Th.4.
Remark 3. Note that, in the definition of model-theoretical conservativity, we
do not merely demand every model to have an extension to a model of Th, in
which case both notion of conservativity would be the same. We say thatM′
is an expansion ofM ifM andM′ are the same model, except thatM′ carries
interpretation of additional function, relation and constant symbols.
The two notions lead in the natural way to the following generalisations:
Definition 4. Let Th1 and Th2 be two truth theories.
1. We say that Th1 is proof-theoretically not stronger than Th2 if every LPA sen-
tence provable in Th1 is provable in Th2. If Th1 is proof-theoretically not
stronger than Th1, we will denote it with Th1 ≤P Th2.5
2. We say that Th1 is model-theoretically not stronger than Th2 if every model
which can be expanded to a model of Th2, can be expanded to a model of
Th1. If Th1 is syntactically not stronger than Th1, we will denote it with
Th1 ≤M Th2.6
Obviouslywe say that Th2 is proof-theoretically (model-theoretically) stronger
than Th1 if Th1 ≤P Th2 but Th2 P Th1 (respectively, Th1 ≤M Th2 but
Th2 M Th1). This relation will be denoted P (M respectively).
Let us observe that the three notions of strength introduced above can be
ordered with respect to their "granularity". Indeed, for any theories Th1 and
Th2 we have:
Th1 ≤F Th2 =⇒ Th1 ≤M Th2 =⇒ Th1 ≤P Th2. (FMP )
Hence also
Th2 P Th1 =⇒ Th2 M Th1 =⇒ Th2 P Th2 (¬PMF )
Having three different notions of strength makes it possible to decide not only
whether one theory of truth is stronger than another one, but also how much
stronger it is.
3This property is also called syntactical conservativity
4This relation is also called semantical conservativity
5P is meant to abbreviate "Proof".
6M is meant to abbreviate "Model".
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1.3 Compositional Positive Truth and its Extensions
Before continuing let us introduce some handy notational conventions:
Convention 1.
1. Byusing variablesφ, ψwe implicitly restrict quantification to (Gödel codes
of) arithmetical sentences. For example, by∀φ Ψ(φ)wemean∀x
(
Sent(x)→
Ψ(x)
)
and by ∃φ Ψ(φ) we mean ∃x
(
Sent(x) ∧ Ψ(x)
)
. For brevity, we
will sometimes also use variables φ, ψ to run over arithmetical formulae,
whenever it is clear from the context which one we mean; similarly
(a) φ(v), ψ(v) run over arithmetical formulaewith at most one indicated
free variable (i.e. φ(v) is either a formula with exactly one free vari-
able or a sentence); φ(x¯), ψ(x¯) . . . run over arbitrary arithmetical for-
mulae.
(b) s, t run over codes of closed arithmetical terms;
(c) v, v1, v2, . . . , w, w1, w2, . . . run over codes of variables;
2. FormLPA(x), Form
≤1
LPA
(x), SentLPA(x) are natural arithmetical formulae strongly
representing in PA the sets of (Gödel codes of) formulae of LPA, formulae
of LPA with at most one free variable, sentences of LPA, respectively.
3. ifφ is aLPA formula, then pφq denotes either its Gödel code or the numeral
denoting the Gödel code of φ (context-dependently). This is the unique
way of using p·q in this paper.
4. to enhance readabilitywe suppress the formulae representing the syntac-
tic operations. For example we write Φ(ψ ∧ η) instead of Φ(x)∧ "x is the
conjunction of ψ and η", similarly, we write Φ(ψ(t)) instead of Φ(x) ∧ x =
Subst(ψ, t);
5. x denotes the (Gödel code of) standard numeral for x, i.e. pS . . . S(0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
x times S
q
6. y◦ is the standard arithmetically definable function representing the value
of term (coded by) y.
The main objective of this study is to measure the strength of theories that
are compositional, but do not enjoy the global axiom for commutativity with
the negation, i.e.
∀φ
(
T (¬φ) ≡ ¬T (φ)
)
(NEG)
Let us formulate the theories which will be of the main interest.
Definition 5. PT− is the axiomatic truth theory with the following axioms for
the truth predicate:
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1. (a) ∀s, t
(
T (s = t) ≡ (s◦ = t◦)
)
(b) ∀s, t
(
T (¬s = t) ≡ (s◦ 6= t◦)
)
2. (a) ∀φ, ψ
(
T (φ ∨ ψ) ≡ T (φ) ∨ T (ψ)
)
(b) ∀φ, ψ
(
T (¬(φ ∨ ψ)) ≡ T (¬φ) ∧ T (¬ψ)
)
3. (a) ∀v∀φ(v)
(
T (∃vφ) ≡ ∃x T (φ(x))
)
(b) ∀v∀φ(v)
(
T (¬∃vφ) ≡ ∀x T (¬φ(x))
)
4. ∀φ
(
T (¬¬φ) ≡ T (φ)
)
5. ∀φ∀s, t
(
s◦ = t◦ →
(
T (φ(s)) ≡ T (φ(t))
))
In the arithmetized language, we treat ∧ and ∀ as symbols defined contex-
tually, i.e. φ ∧ ψ = ¬(¬φ ∨ ¬ψ) and ∀vφ = ¬∃v¬φ. Then it is easy to check that
the following sentences are provable in PT−:
1. ∀φ, ψ (T (φ ∧ ψ) ≡ (T (φ) ∧ T (ψ))).
2. ∀φ, ψ (T (¬ (φ ∧ ψ)) ≡ (T (¬φ) ∨ T (p¬ψq))).
3. ∀v∀φ(v) (T (∀vφ) ≡ (∀x T (φ(x)))
4. ∀v∀φ(v) (T (¬∀vφ) ≡ (∃x T (¬φ(x)))
In PT− the internal logic (i.e. the logic of all true sentences) is modelled after
the Strong Kleene Scheme. Let us observe that axioms of PT− make it possible
to accept a disjunction φ ∨ ψ as true simply on the basis of the truth of one of φ
and ψ and regardless of whether the second one has its truth value determined.
The second theory we will study is more cautious in this respect. Let us define
tot(φ(v)) := Form≤1(φ(v)) ∧ ∀x
(
T (φ(x)) ∨ T (¬φ(x))
)
In particular if ψ is a sentence, then
PAT− ⊢ tot(ψ) ≡
(
T (ψ) ∨ T (¬ψ)
)
.
where PAT− is the extension of PA in LPA∪{T }, with no non-logical axioms for
T .
Definition 6. WPT− is the axiomatic truth theory with the following axioms
for the truth predicate:
1. (a) ∀s, t
(
T (s = t) ≡ (s◦ = t◦)
)
(b) ∀s, t
(
T (¬s = t) ≡ (s◦ 6= t◦)
)
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2. (a) ∀φ, ψ
(
T (φ ∨ ψ) ≡
(
tot(φ) ∧ tot(ψ) ∧
(
T (φ) ∨ T (ψ)
))
(b) ∀φ, ψ
(
T (¬(φ ∨ ψ)) ≡ T (¬φ) ∧ T (¬ψ)
)
3. (a) ∀v∀φ(v)
(
T (∃vφ) ≡ tot(φ(v)) ∧ ∃xT (φ(x))
)
(b) ∀v∀φ(v)
(
T (¬∃vφ) ≡ ∀x T (¬φ(x))
)
4. ∀φ
(
T (¬¬φ) ≡ T (φ)
)
5. ∀φ∀s, t
(
s◦ = t◦ → T (φ(s)) ≡ T (φ(t))
)
Using the above mentioned conventions regarding ∧ and ∀, it is an easy
exercise to show that the following sentences are provable in WPT−:
1. ∀φ, ψ (T (φ ∧ ψ) ≡ (T (φ) ∧ T (ψ))).
2. ∀φ, ψ (T (¬ (φ ∧ ψ)) ≡ (tot(φ) ∧ tot(ψ) ∧ (T (¬φ) ∨ T (¬ψ)))).
3. ∀v∀φ(v) (T (∀vφ) ≡ (∀x T (φ(x)))
4. ∀v∀φ(v) (T (¬∀vφ) ≡ (tot(φ(v)) ∧ ∃x T (¬φ(x))))
In WPT− the internal logic is modelled after the Weak Kleene Scheme. (W)PT−
can be seen as a natural stratified counterpart of (W)KF−7 Since in particular
(W)PT− is a subtheory of (W)KF− and the latter are well known to be model-
theoretically conservative over PA (see [1]; wewill outline direct proof ofmodel-
theoretical conservativity of PT− in Section 3), we have
Proposition 7. PT− andWPT− are model-theoretically conservative.
In particular we see that the axiom (NEG) may contribute to the strength of
truth theories: it is easy to see that (W )PT− + (NEG) is deductively equivalent
to the theory CT−, hence in particular by the well-known theorem of Lachlan
(see [10],[14]) it is not semantically conservative.
For the sake of convenience let us isolate one easily noticeable feature of PT−
and WPT−:
Definition 8 (UTB). Let φ(x0, . . . , xn) be any arithmetical formula. UTB
−(φ) is
the following LT sentence
∀t0 . . . tn
(
T (pφ(t0, . . . , tn)q) ≡ φ(t0
◦, . . . , tn
◦)
)
(UTB−(φ))
Define
UTB− := {UTB−(φ(x0, . . . , xn)) | φ(x0, . . . , xn) ∈ LPA}
And UTB to be the extensions of UTB− with all instantiations of induction
scheme with LT formulae.
7For the definition of all mentioned theories not defined in this paper, consult [10] or [9] (for
WKF).
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Fact 9. Both PT− andWPT− prove UTB−.
In [6],[7] and [8] (this last philosophical motivation was summarized also in
[4]) authors motivated the need for a weak theory of truth which would be able
to prove in a single sentence the fact that every arithmetical formula satisfy the
induction scheme. Such a fact can be naturally expressed by an LT sentence
∀φ(x)
[(
∀x
(
T (φ(x))→ T (φ(x+ 1)
))
−→
(
T (φ(0))→ ∀xT (φ(x))
)]
(INT)
For further usage let us abbreviate the formula
(
∀x
(
T (φ(x))→ T (φ(x+ 1)
))
−→
(
T (φ(0))→ ∀xT (φ(x))
)
by INT(φ(x)). Using Fact 9, we see that both PT− + INT and WPT− + INT
can prove any arithmetical instance of the induction schema in a uniform way,
for each formula using the same finitely many axioms8. In particular, it can be
finitely axiomatised by taking IΣ1 together with axioms for the truth predicate
from PT− and (INT). To achieve this goal, however, none of the discussed theo-
ries uses the full strength of (INT). ByUTB−(φ) every standard formula is total,
provably in WPT−. Hence it makes good sense to consider a version of (INT)
restricted to total formulae, i.e.
∀φ(v)
[
tot(φ(v)) −→ INT(φ(v))
]
(INT ↾tot)
The theory PT− + INT ↾tot was claimed to be model-theoretically conserva-
tive in [5] (and then used in [6],[7] and [8] as such). However, as shown in [4],
the proof of its conservativity contained an essential gap and no prime model
of PA9 admits an expansion to the model of PT− + INT ↾tot. Moreover, it was
shown that every recursively saturatedmodel of PA can be expanded to amodel
of this theory. In particular, PT−+ INT ↾tot is model-theoretically stronger than
PT− and weaker than UTB and CT−.
In the current study, we further approximate the class of models expandable
to PT− + INT ↾tot and compare the strength of UTB with the strength of PT
− +
INT. Moreover we show that WPT− + INT is model theoretically conservative
and meets the requirements posed in [8]. Our results jointly with some well-
known facts from the literature give the following picture of interdependencies
between proof-theoretically conservative theories of truth:
8The proof is really easy: we fix φ(x) (with parameters), prove the instantiation of the UTB−(φ)
scheme for φ and substitute φ(x) for T (φ(x)) in INT
9For the definition of all notions from the model theory of PA see [14].
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CT− + INT
CT−
?
⇐⇒ PT− + INT
UTB
PT− + INT ↾tot
TB
PT− ⇐⇒ WPT− + INT
where −→ stands for M and =⇒ for ≤M . The question whether any of =⇒
arrows is in fact a −→ arrow is open. Similarly, the relation between classes of
models of CT− and PT− + INT is unknown.
2 Models of PT− + INT ↾tot
In the paper [4], it has been shown that PT−+INT ↾tot is not semantically conser-
vative over PA and, moreover, any (not necessarily countable) recursively satu-
rated model of PA admits an expansion to a model of PT− + INT ↾tot. The non-
conservativity result has been obtained by demonstrating that no prime model
of PA can be expanded in such a way. Now, we will show a strengthening of
that result. Let us first recall one definition.
Definition 10. Let M be a model of PA. We say that M is short recursively
saturated if any recursive type (with finitely many parametres fromM ) of the
form p(x) = {x < a ∧ φi(x) | i ∈ N} is realised in M where a is some fixed
parameter fromM .
In other words, a model is short recursively saturated if it realises all types
which are finitely realised below some fixed element. This notion is strictly
weaker than full recursive saturation. For example, the standard model N is
short recursively saturated but not recursively saturated. More generally, a
countable model is short recursively saturated if and only if it has a recursively
saturated elementary end extension, see [18], Theorem 2.8.
Theorem 11. LetM |= PA and suppose thatM has an expansion (M,T ) |= PT− +
INT ↾tot. ThenM is short recursively saturated.
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The proof of our theorem will closely parallel the proof of Theorem 4 from
[4]. In particular, we will again use a propositional construction invented by
Smith.
Definition 12. Let (αi)i≤c, (βi)i≤c be any sequences of sentences. We define the
alternative with stopping condition (αi)
c,α∨
i=i0
βi
by backwards induction on i0 as follows:
1.
∨c,α
i=c βi = αc ∧ βc.
2.
∨c,α
i=k βi = ¬(αk ∧ ¬βk) ∧
(
(αk ∧ βk) ∨
(
¬αk ∧
∨c,α
i=k+1 βi
))
.
Wemay think that this is a formalisation in propositional logic of the follow-
ing instruction: for i from i0 up to c, search for the first number j such that αj
holds and then check whether also βj holds. Then stop your search. The whole
formula is true if this βj is true and is false if either βj is false or there is no j
such that αj holds. It turns out that this intuition may be partially recovered in
theories of truth, even if one does not assume that the truth predicate satisfies
induction axioms.
Lemma 13. Fix (M,T ) |= PT−. Suppose that (αi)i≤c is a sequence of arithmetical
sentences coded inM . Suppose that the least j such that T (αj) holds is standard, say
j = j0, and that for any k ≤ j0 either T (βk) or T (¬βk) holds. Then
1. (M,T ) |= T
(∨c,α
i=c βi
)
≡ T (βj0) .
2. (M,T ) |= T
(
¬
∨c,α
i=c βi
)
≡ T (¬βj0) .
For a proof, see [4], Lemma 2.3. Now we are ready to prove that any model
of PA expandable to a model of PT− + INT ↾tot is short recursively saturated.
Proof. Fix any recursive type p(x) = (φi(x) ∧ x < a)i∈ω (with a parameter a)
and suppose that for any finite set φ0, . . . , φk there is some bk < a such that
M |= φ0(bk) ∧ . . . ∧ φk(bk). Let
α0(x) = ¬x < a ∨ ¬φ0(x)
αj+1(x) = x < a ∧ φ0(x) ∧ . . . ∧ φj(x) ∧ ¬φj+1(x).
In a sense, formulae αj(x) measure how much of the type p is realised by x.
Now, if the type p is ommitted in the model M , then for any x, there exists a
standard j such that (M,T ) |= Tαj(x). Let βj(y) be defined as
βj(y) = y < a ∧ φ0(y) ∧ . . . ∧ φj+1(y).
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Now, fix any nonstandard c and consider the (nonstandard) formula
φ(x, y) =
c,α(x)∨
i=0
βi(y).
By Lemma 13 and our assumption that the type p is omitted inM , the sentence
φ(x, y) is either true or false for any fixed x, y ∈ M. But this means that the
formula φ(x, y) is total. One can check that then a formula
ψ(z) = ∃y∀x < zφ(x, y)
is also total. Note that this formula intuitively says that there is a y which satis-
fies more of a type p than any of the elements ofM up to z.Now, we will show
that ψ(z) is progressive, i.e.,
(M,T ) |= ∀z
(
Tψ(z)→ Tψ(z + 1)
)
.
Fix any z and suppose that Tψ(z) holds. Then there exists a y such that T (p∀x <
z φ(x, y)q).Now, let j be the least number such that Tαj(z). Since j is a standard
number and p is a type, there exists y′ such that φ0(y
′) ∧ . . . ∧ φj+1(y′) holds in
M , i.e. (M,T ) |= Tβj(y′). Let y′′ = y if also
T
(
φ0(y) ∧ . . . ∧ φj+1(y)
)
and y′′ = y′ otherwise. In other hand, we fix either y or y′, whichever satisfies
”more” formulae φi. One readily checks that then
(M,T ) |= ∀x < z + 1 φ(x, y′′).
We have shown that the formula ψ(z) is total and progressive. By the inter-
nal induction for total formulae this means that
(M,T ) |= ∀z Tψ(z).
In particular, we have Tψ(a), where a is the parameter used as a bound in the
type p. But then for some d, we have
(M,T ) |= ∀x < a Tφ(x, d).
Now, since p is a type, for an arbitrary k ∈ ω, there exists some x < d such that
φ0(x)∧ . . .∧φk(x). Since (M,T ) |= Tφ(x, d), it follows that d < a∧φ0(d)∧ . . .∧
φk+1(d). As we have chosen an arbitrary k, we see that actually d satisfies the
type p. We conclude thatM is short recursively saturated.
Let us summarize our findings from [4] and this paper:
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• Any recursively saturated model of PA (possibly uncountable) admits an
expansion to a model of PT− + INT ↾tot .
• If a modelM expands to a model of PT−+ INT ↾tot, then it is short recur-
sively saturated.
Unfortunately, we do not know whether any of the implications reverses.
Cieśliński and Engström have (independetly) found the following charac-
terisation the class of models of PA which admit an expansion to a model of
TB, i.e., the truth theory axiomatised with the induction scheme for the whole
language and the following scheme of Tarski’s biconditionals:
T (pφq) ≡ φ,
where φ is an arithmetical sentence.
Theorem 14 (Cieśliński, Engström). 10 LetM be a nonstandard model of PA. Then
the following are equivalent:
1. M admits an expansion to a model (M,T ) |= TB.
2. There exists an element c ∈M such that for all (standard) arithmetical sentences
φ,M |= pφq ∈ c iffM |= φ, i.e.,M codes its own theory.
It can be easily shown that every nonstandard short recursively saturated
modelM |= PA satisfies the second item of the above characterisation. Hence,
every short recursively saturated model of PA admits an expansion to a model
of TB. Thus we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 15. TB ≤M PT
− + INT ↾tot, i.e., every modelM |= PA which admits an
expansion to a model of PT− + INT ↾tot, also admits an expansion to a model of TB.
2.1 A non-result
We are going to show that the method used to prove that every recursively
saturatedmodel of PA admits an expansion to a model of PT−+ INT ↾tot cannot
be used to obtain a stricter upper bound on the class of models expandable to
this theory (if such a stricter upper bound exists). Let us recall that in [4], it
was shown that every recursively saturated model of PA can be expanded to
a model of PT− + INT ↾tot. Let us recall the standard definition of a function
which generates possible extensions for the PT− truth predicate.
10See [3], Theorem 7.
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Convention 2. If M |= PA, then SentM, Form
≤1
M , TermM denote the set of
sentences of LPA, the set of formulae with at most one free variable and the set
of terms, respectively, in the sense ofM.
Definition 16. LetM |= PA and A ⊆M. Define:
ΘM(φ,A) := M |= ∃s, t [φ = (s = t) ∧ s
◦ = t◦]
∨ M |= ∃s, t [φ = ¬(s = t) ∧ s◦ 6= t◦]
∨ ∃ψ ∈ SentM[M |= φ = ¬¬ψ] ∧ ψ ∈ A
∨ ∃ψ1, ψ2 ∈ SentM[M |= φ = (ψ1 ∨ ψ2)] ∧
(
ψ1 ∈ A) ∨ (ψ2 ∈ A)
)
∨ ∃ψ1, ψ2 ∈ SentM[M |= φ = ¬(ψ1 ∨ ψ2)] ∧
(
(¬ψ1 ∈ A) ∧ (¬ψ2 ∈ A)
)
∨ ∃ψ(x) ∈ Form1M[M |= φ = ∃xψ] ∧ ∃x ∈M (ψ(x) ∈ A)
∨ ∃ψ(x) ∈ Form1M[M |= φ = ¬∃xψ] ∧ ∀x ∈ M (¬ψ(x) ∈ A)
Let ΓM : P(M)→ P(M) be the function defined:
ΓM(A) = {φ ∈ M | ΘM(φ,A)}. (Γ)
Let us now define:
ΓM0 = Γ
M(∅)
ΓMα+1 = Γ
M(ΓMα )
ΓMβ =
⋃
α<β
ΓMα , for β a limit ordinal.
It can be checked that for some ordinal αwe must get ΓMα+1 = Γ
M
α , i.e., Γ
M
α is a
fixpoint of ΓM. In general, if A is any fixpoint of ΓM, then
(M, A) |= PT−.
Let αM denote the least ordinal α such that Γ
M
α is a fixpoint of Γ
M.
In [4], the following lemmata were proved:
Lemma 17. IfM |= PA is recursively saturated, then αM = ω.
Lemma 18. IfM |= PA and αM = ω, then (M,ΓMω ) |= PT
− + INT ↾tot.
Nowwe shall show that the converse to 17 holds. In particular, our method
of finding extensions for PT− + INT ↾tot works only for recursively saturated
models.
Lemma 19. For every non-standard M |= PA. If αM = ω, then M is recursively
saturated.
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Proof. We prove the contraposition: suppose that a non-standard modelM is
not recursively saturated. Let p(x) be a recursive type using parameters from a¯
which is omitted inM. Let (φi(x, y¯))i be an arithmetically representable enu-
meration of formulae in p(x). Without loss of generality, assume that φ0(x, y¯) =
(x = x). Let
ψi(x, y¯) =
∧
j<i
φj(x, y¯) ∧ ¬φi(x, y¯)
Then every b ∈ M satisfies exactly one of ψi(x, a¯) (since p(x) is omitted). Now,
for every n ∈ ω we shall define formulae θn(x) as follows:
θ0n(x) = (x 6= x)
θk+1n (x, y¯) = ψn−(k+1)(x, y¯) ∨ θ
k
n(x, y¯)
θn(x, y¯) = θ
n
n(x, y¯)
Let us observe that the above construction can be arithmetized and therefore
for some b ∈ M \ N there exists a (code of a) formula θb(x, y¯), which is of the
following form:
(ψ0(x, y¯) ∨ (ψ1(x, y¯) ∨ (ψ2(x, y¯) ∨ (. . . (ψb−1(x, y¯) ∨ x 6= x) . . .)
Then for each c ∈ M , there exists n ∈ ω such that θb(c, a¯) ∈ ΓMn , since each c
satisfies some ψi(x, a¯). But also for every i ∈ ω, there exists c ∈M such that the
least n for which ψn(c, a¯) is greater than i. Consequently, there is no k ∈ ω for
which
θb(c, a¯) ∈ Γ
M
k
for every c ∈M . In particular, ∀vθ(v, a¯) /∈ ΓMω and consequently the PT
− axiom
∀v∀φ(v)
(
T (∀vφ) ≡ ∀xT (φ(x))
)
is not satisfied in (M,ΓMω ). Hence αM 6= ω.
3 Models of PT− + INT
Since we have shown that PT− + INT ↾tot is not a model-theoretically weak
theory, as was originally hoped, one could start wondering whether it differs
in some significant respect from PT− + INT. In this section, we will show that
actually this is the case. Namely, it turns out that PT− + INT is still model-
theoretically stronger than PT− + INT ↾tot . As we shall see, any model of PA
expandable to a model of PT− + INT, is also expandable to a model of UTB.
We know that any model of PA expandable to a model of UTB is recursively
saturated and that this containment is strict, i.e., not every recursively saturated
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model of PA admits an expansion to a model of UTB.11 On the other hand, it
has been shown in [4], Theorem 3.3 that any recursively saturated model of PA
admits an expansion to a model of PT− + INT ↾tot .
Theorem 20. Suppose that (M,T ) is a model of PT− + INT. Then there exists a T ′
such that (M,T ′) |= UTB.
Proof. Let (M,T ) |= PT−+INT. Wewill find T ′ such that (M,T ′) |= UTB.With-
out loss of generalitywemay assume thatM is nonstandard. As in the previous
section, we will use Lemma 13. Let us fix any primitive recursive enumeration
(φi)
∞
i=0 of arithmetical formulae. Then let
α′i(φ, t)
be defined as the (formalised version of the) formula "t is a (finite) sequence of
terms (t1, . . . , tn) and φ = φi(t1, . . . , tn)" and let
αi(φ, t, b) = α
′
i(φ, t) ∨ i > b.
Let
β′i(t)
be defined as ”t is a (finite) sequence of terms t1, . . . , tn and φi(t1, . . . , tn).” Let
βi(t, b)
be β′i(t) ∧ i ≤ b. Note that φ is not a free variable of the formula βi. Let us fix
any nonstandard c ∈M and let
τ(φ, t, b) =
α(φ,t,b),c∨
i=0
βi(t).
Note that for any standard c the predicate τ is equivalent to the very simple
arithmetical truth predicate:
τn(φ, t, b) =
n∨
i=0
φ = φi(t) ∧ φi(t) ∧ i < b.
At this point one may wonder, what is the role of the variable b. It is indeed
technical. We artificially truncate our truth predicates so that they work only
11We know that there exist rather classless recursively saturated models of PA, i.e., recursively
saturated modelsM |= PA with the following property: for every X ⊆ M such that every initial
segment ofX is codedM , the setX is definable inM with an arithmetical formula (with parame-
tres). Since no subset ofM definable with an arithmetical formula can satisfy UTB−, we see that no
such modelM can admit an expansion to a model of UTB. The existence of recursively saturated,
rather classless models has been shown by Kaufmann in [13] under an additional set-theoretic as-
sumption ⋄. The assumption has been dropped by Shelah, [17], Application C, p. 74.
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for the first b formulae. This is to some extent controlled by the parameter c
in the definition of τ , since whenever c is standard, the formula τ works like a
truth predicate only for the first c sentences. However, c is not a variable in the
formula τ , but rather a parameter describing the syntactic shape of τ , whereas
we need this truncation to be expressed with a variable for reasons which will
shortly become clear.
It turns out that for some parameter b the formula given by
T ′(φ) = ∃t T (τ(φ, t, b))
satisfies UTB. We will prove this claim in a series of lemmata. This will obvi-
ously conclude our proof.
Lemma 21. Let τ ′(φ, t) = τ(φ, t, b) for some fixed nonstandard b. Then for an arbi-
trary standard arithmetical formula φ(v1, . . . , vn) and an arbitrary sequence of terms
t = (t1, . . . , tn), possibly nonstandard (the length of the sequence is assumed to be
standard).
(M,T ) |= Tτ ′(φ(t1, . . . , tn), t) ≡ φ(t1, . . . , tn).
Proof. If φ is standard, then φ = φi for some standard i. So by Lemma 13
(M,T ) |= Tτ ′(φ(t1, . . . , tn), t) ≡ βi(t) ≡ φi(t1, . . . , tn),
which is exactly the claim of the lemma.
Note that the above lemma is true in purePT−. Wehaveused no induction at
all. Nowwe only need to check that for some parameter b the predicate T ′(φ, t)
defined as Tτ(φ, t, b) is fully inductive.
Lemma 22. Let T ′ be defined as in the above proof. Then for some b, the formula
τ ′(φ, t) = τ(φ, t, b) is total and consistent i.e. for all φ and t, exactly one of Tτ ′(φ, t),
T¬τ ′(φ, t) holds.
Proof. Note first that for any standard b, the formula τ(φ, t, b) is total and con-
sistent. Namely, since αi(φ, t, n) is true for any i > n, we see that for any φ, t
the least i such that αi(φ, t, n) holds is standard (it is at most n + 1) and then
the assumptions of Lemma 13 are satisfied. This implies that for any fixed ξ
the formula Tτ(ξ, t, n) is equivalent to some φi(t
◦)∧ i ≤ n, which is a standard
formula. This implies that for any t, exactly one of Tτ(ξ, t, n), T¬τ(ξ, t, n) holds.
Now, consider the formula
ψ(b) = ∀φ, t
(
τ(φ, t, b) ∨ ¬τ(φ, t, b)
)
.
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We have just shown that for an arbitrary standard n we have T∀b < n ψ(b). So
by internal induction we have for some nonstandard d1
T
(
∀b ≤ d1∀φ, t
(
τ(φ, t, b) ∨ ¬τ(φ, t, b)
))
,
which gives
∀b ≤ d1∀φ, t
(
Tτ(φ, t, b) ∨ T¬τ(φ, t, b)
)
Similarly, let
ξ(b) = ∃φ, t
(
τ(φ, t, b) ∧ ¬τ(φ, t, b)
)
.
Suppose that T (∃d < b ξ(d)) holds for any nonstandard b < d1. Then by un-
derspill we would have Tξ(n) for some n ∈ ω. But we have just shown that this
is impossible. So there exists some nonstandard b < d1 such that for any d ≤ b
and any φ, t at most one of Tτ(φ, t, d), T¬τ(φ, t, d) holds. At the same time, we
know that at least one of these formulae holds. So τ ′(φ, t) = τ(φ, t, b) is total
and consistent.
We are very close to showing that we have defined a predicate satisfying
full induction. Before we proceed, we have to introduce some new notation.
Let η be any formula containing a unary predicate P not in the language of
PT− and let ξ(v) be an arbitrary formula with one free variable. Then by η[ξ/P ]
(or simply η[ξ]) we mean a formula resulting from substituting ξ(vi) for any
instance of P (vi) in η. We assume that all the variables in η has been renamed
so as to avoid clashes.
Let us give an example. Let η(x, y) = P (x + y) ∧ ∃z (z = y ∧ P (z)). Let
ξ(v) = (v > 0). Then
η[ξ] = x+ y > 0 ∧ ∃z (z = y ∧ z > 0).
Now, basically, we would like to finish the proof in the following way. Let
τ ′ be a total formula defined as in the above lemmata and let η be an arbitrary
standard formula from the arithmetical language enlarged with a fresh unary
predicate P . Then, applying compositional axioms a couple of times, we see
that
T (η[τ ]) ≡ η[Tτ ].
Let us call this principle the generalised commutativity. If this were true, then
we could conclude our proof. Namely, by the internal induction principle, we
know that
(
∀x
(
T (η[τ ](x))→ T (η[τ ](x + 1))
)
−→
(
T (η[τ ](0))→ ∀xT (η[τ ](x))
)
which, by generalised commutativity, would allow us to conclude that
(
∀x
(
η[Tτ ](x)→ (η[Tτ ](x+ 1)
))
−→
(
η[Tτ ](0)→ ∀xη[Tτ ](x)
)
.
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Since the choice of η was arbitrary, this precisely means that τ satisfies the full
induction scheme.
The generalised commutativity principle in the form stated above does not
even quite make sense, since we would have to apply the truth predicate to a
formula containing free variables. Therefore, we have to restate it in somewhat
more careful manner.
Definition 23. Fix a unary predicate P . Let η be an arbitrary formula from the
language containing that predicate. We say that η is in semirelational form if
the predicate P is applied only to variables rather than to arbitrary terms.
We may always assume that formulae we use are semirelational, since we
may eliminate any occurrence of P (t) for complex terms t, by replacing it with
∃x (x = t ∧ P (x)). This is expressed in the following lemma:
Lemma24. Any formula is equivalent in first-order-logic to a formula in semirelational
form.
Now we are ready to state generalised commutativity lemma in a proper
manner.
Lemma 25. Let (M,T ) |= PT−. Let T ∗ ξ(x) = T (ξ(x)) for every x. Suppose that
ξ is total and consistent. Let η be an arbitrary standard formula from the arithmetical
language extended with a fresh unary predicate P . Then the formula η[ξ] is total and
consistent, and
(M,T ) |= ∀x1, . . . , xn
(
T (η[ξ](x1, . . . , xn)) ≡ η[T ∗ ξ](x1, . . . , xn)
)
.
The lemma generalises to the case, where the predicate P is not unary (i.e.
ξ may have more than one variable). The proof may be easily adapted to cover
this case. We will actually use the lemma for the case with P binary.
Proof. We prove both claims simultanously by induction on complexity of η.
Suppose that η is an atomic formula. Then it is either of the shape s = t for
some standard arithmetical terms s,t, or of the form P (x).
In the first case, η[ξ] = η, and the following equivalences hold:
T (s(x1, . . . , xn) = t(x1, . . . , xn)) ≡ s(x1, . . . , xn)
◦ = t(x1, . . . , xn)
◦
≡ s(x1, . . . , xn) = t(x1, . . . , xn)
= η[T ∗ ξ](x1, . . . , xn).
If η = P (x), then η[ξ] = ξ and
T (η[ξ](x)) = Tξ(x) = η[T ∗ ξ](x).
17
So let prove the induction step. If η is a conjunction or disjunction, then the
proof is straightforward (the fact that a conjunction or disjunction of sentences
which are either true or false is itself either true or false is an easy application
of the compositional axioms of PT−). If η = ¬ρ, then we know by induction
hypothesis that ρ[η] is total and consistent. Then by the compositional axiom
for double negation for the truth predicate, the formula ¬ρ[η] is also total and
consistent and the following equivalences hold:
T (¬ρ[η](x1, . . . , xn)) ≡ ¬T (ρ[η](x1, . . . , xn))
≡ ¬ρ[T ∗ η](x1, . . . , xn).
The induction step for quantifier axioms is also simple. Let us prove it for
the existential quantifier. Suppose that η = ∃x ρ(x, x1, . . . , xn). Then
T (∃x ρ[ξ](x, x1, . . . , xn)) ≡ ∃x T (ρ[ξ](x, x1, . . . , xn)
≡ ∃x ρ[T ∗ ξ](x, x1 . . . , xn)
= η[T ∗ ξ](x1, . . . , xn).
The second equivalence follows by the induction hypothesis and the last equal-
ity by definition. So let us check that η[ξ] is total and consistent. Suppose that
T (∃xρ[ξ](x, x1, . . . , xn)) does not hold. Then by compositional axioms for the
truth predicate, there is no x such that
T (ρ(x, x1, . . . , xn)).
By induction hypothesis, ρ is total and consistent, so for all xwe must have
T (¬ρ[ξ](x, x1, . . . , xn)).
This entails, again by compositional clauses
T (¬∃x ρ[ξ](x, x1, . . . , xn)).
Nowwe are ready to conclude the proof of our theorem.
Lemma 26. Let (M,T ) be any nonstandardmodel ofPT−+INT. Suppose that τ ′(φ, t)
satisfies the claim Lemma 22. Then the predicate T ′(φ, t) defined as T ∗τ ′(φ, t) satisfies
the full induction scheme.
Proof. By internal induction principle, the following holds for an arbitrary stan-
dard η from the arithmetical language extendedwith one fresh unary predicate
P (v):(
∀x
(
T (η[τ ](x))→ T (η[τ ](x + 1)
))
−→
(
T (η[τ ](0))→ ∀xT (η[τ ](x))
)
,
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Since τ ′ is total, if we additionally assume that η is semirelational, we can reach
the following conclusion by Lemma 25:(
∀x
(
η[T ∗ τ ](x)→ (η[T ∗ τ ](x + 1)
))
−→
(
η[T ∗ τ ](0)→ ∀xη[T ∗ τ ](x)
)
.
Since ηwas an arbitrary semirelational formula and any formula is equivalent to
a semirelational one, this shows that T ′ satisfies the full induction scheme.
The conclusion of the proof of Theorem 20. We have defined a formula T ∗ τ ′(φ, t)
which satisfies full induction scheme and such that for an arbitrary standard
φ(v1, . . . , vn) and an arbitrary sequence of terms (t1, . . . , tn) the following holds:
(M,T ) |= T ∗ τ ′(φ(t1, . . . , tn), t) ≡ φ(t1, . . . , tn).
Then the formula T ′(φ) defined as
∃t T ∗ τ ′(φ, t)
satisfies the uniform disquotation axioms of UTB as well as the full induction
scheme. So it defines a predicate satisfying UTB in (M,T ).
This model-theoretic result allows us to make some conclusions concerning
relative definability of the introduced theories.
Corollary 27. The theory PT−+INT ↾tot does not relatively truth defines PT
−+INT.
Proof. We have just checked that every model (M,T ) |= PT− + INT ↾tot may
be expanded to a model of UTB. By Theorem TODO, there exist recursively
saturated rather classless models which cannot be expanded to any model of
UTB. On the other hand in [4], Theorem 3.3, it has been shown that any recur-
sively saturated model can be expanded to a model of PT− + INT ↾tot . Thus,
there exist models of PT− + INT ↾tot which cannot be expanded to a model of
PT− + INT. This contradicts relative definability.
4 Weak and Expressive Theories of Truth
In [8], the authors searched for a theory of truth that would simultaneously
satisfy two requirements:
1. It could model the use of truth in model theory;
2. It would witness the expressive function of the notion of truth.
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The way to satisfy the former is to be model-theoretically conservative over
PA. Being such, the theory would not discriminate among possible interpreta-
tions of our basis theory. The way to satisfy the latter is to allow for expressing
"thoughts" which are not expressible in the basis theory. There are many ways
in which a theory of truth canwitness the expressive role of the notion of truth.
Tomention just two (for the rest of the examples the Reader should consult [8]):
if a theory of truth is finitely axiomatizable, then it is more expressive (than PA)
and if a theory of truth has non-elementary speed-up over PA, then it is more
expressive (thanPA). There is a canonical constructionwhich produces a theory
of truth satisfying both finite-axiomatizability and the speed-up desideratum:
the theory has to be (at least partially) classically compositional and it has to
prove that all standard instantiations of the induction scheme are true. With-
out aspiring to any sort of completeness, let us offer the following explication
of both properties. We start with a useful definition:
Definition 28. Let CC(x) denote the disjunction of the following formulae
• ∃s, t
(
x = (s = t) ∧ (T (x) ≡ s◦ = t◦)
)
• ∃φ, ψ
(
x = φ ∨ ψ ∧ (T (x) ≡ T (φ) ∨ T (ψ))
)
• ∃φ
(
x = ¬φ ∧ (T (x) ≡ ¬T (φ))
)
• ∃φ∃v
(
x = ∃vφ ∧ (T (x) ≡ ∃yT (φ(y)))
)
• Form≤1(x) ∧ ∀s, t
(
s◦ = t◦ →
(
T (x(s)) ≡ T (x(t))
))
Informally, CC(x) says that x is a formula on which T behaves composition-
ally in the sense of classical first-order logic.
Definition29. Atruth theory Th is partially classically compositional if there exists
a formulaD(y) such that Th proves the following sentences:
1. ∀y(D(y)→ ∀x ≤ yD(x));
2. D(0) ∧ ∀y(D(y)→ D(y + 1));
3. ∀y
(
D(y)→ ∀φ(dp(φ) ≤ y → CC(φ))
)
;
where dp(φ) ≤ x denotes an arithmetical formula representing the (primitive
recursive) relation "the depth of the syntactic tree of φ is at most x".
If a formula satisfies the first requirement, we say that it is downward closed. If
a formula satisfies the second one, we say that it is progressive. If a formulaD(y)
is both downward closed and progressive, we will say that it defines an initial
segment. This is justified, since ifD(y) satisfies 1 and 2, then in eachmodelM |=
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Th the set {a ∈ M | M |= D(a)} is an initial segment of the model. In fact,
being downward closed is not a very restrictive condition: ifD(y) is progressive,
then the formula
D′(x) := ∀y ≤ xD(y)
defines an initial segment. (this corresponds to a model-theoretic fact that each
cut can be shortened to an initial segment). The third condition says that if φ is
not too complicated (i.e., its complexity belongs to the initial segment defined
byD), then T behaves classically on φ.
Definition 30. Let ind(φ(x)) denote the instantiation of the induction scheme
with φ(x), i.e., the universal closure of the following formula:
∀x(φ(x)→ φ(x + 1)) −→
(
φ(0)→ ∀xφ(x)
)
Following our conventions, wewill use ind(·) to denote an arithmetical formula
representing the function which, given a Gödel code of a formula with at most
one free variable, returns theGödel code of the corresponding induction axiom.
Definition 31. A truth theory proves the truth of induction if there exists a formula
D(y) such that Th proves that D(y) defines an initial segment and
∀φ(v)
(
D(φ(v))→ T
(
ind(φ(v))
))
. (T(IND))
We shall say that Th is finitely axiomatisable modulo PA if there is a sen-
tence φ such that the logical consequences of Th are precisely the logical conse-
quences of PA ∪ {φ}. For example, CT−, PT− and WPT− are finitely axiomati-
sable modulo PA.
Nowwe have the following theoremwhose unique novelty rests on isolating
the features that are usually used to prove the thesis for concrete theories of
truth.
Theorem 32. Assume that
1. Th is partially classically compositional and proves the truth of induction and
2. Th is finitely axiomatizable modulo PA,
then Th is finitely axiomatizable and it has super-exponential speed-up over PA.
Sketch of the proof. Let D1(y) define an initial segment on which T is classically
compositional. LetD2(y)define an initial segment onwhich Thproves the truth
on induction. ThenD(y) := D1(y)∧D2(y) defines an initial segment on which
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T is classically compositional and proves the truth of induction. Obviously, for
every standard natural number n we have
Th ⊢ D(n)
In particular, Th ⊢ UTB−, which for every concrete formula of standard com-
plexity can be proved by external induction on the complexity of its subformu-
lae. Now, for every standard formula φ(x0, . . . , xn), we can prove ind(φ(x¯)) in
Th in the following way:
1. prove that D defines an initial segment on which T is classically compo-
sitional;
2. prove that D(pind(φ(x¯))q) and concludeD(pφ(x¯)q);
3. prove T(IND);
4. using 2. and 3. conclude T (pind(φ(x¯))q);
5. prove UTB− (ind(φ(x¯)));
6. conclude ind (φ(x¯)).
Observe that, given 1., the proof of D(pind(φ(x¯))q can be constructed in pure
First-OrderLogic. Similarly, given 1., allwe need to use in provingUTB− (ind(φ(x¯)))
are some basic syntactical facts provable in IΣ1. Let φ be a sentence such that
PA∪{φ} is a finite-modulo-PA axiomatisation of Th. It follows that for some n,
every proof of ind(φ(x¯)) can be given in IΣn + φ, hence the theory
IΣn ∪ {φ}
is a finite axiomatization of Th. To prove that Th has super-exponential speed-
up over PA, we show that there is a formulaD′(y)which provably in Th defines
an initial segment and that
Th ⊢ ∀y
(
D′(y)→ ConPA(y)
)
where ConPA(y) is a finitary statement of consistency of PA saying that there is
no PA proof of 0 = 1which can be coded using less than y bits. For the details,
see [6], Theorem 9.
In [6], it was shown that PT−+INT ↾tot satisfies the assumptions of the above
theorem. However, as was shown in [4], this theory is not model-theoretically
conservative over PA. We shall now show that the right theory to use isWPT−+
INT.
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Proposition 33. WPT− is partially classically compositional andWPT−+INT proves
the truth of induction.
Proof. Let us define
D′(y) := ∀x ≤ y∀φ
(
dp(φ) ≤ x −→
(
T (¬φ) ≡ ¬T (φ)
))
.
Then it can be easily shown thatD′(y) provably inWPT− defines an initial seg-
ment on which T is classically compositional (that D′(y) is progressive is as-
sured by the compositional axioms of WPT−). For convenience, let us define:12
GC(x) := Form(x) ∧
(
T (ucl(x)) ≡ ∀σ(Asn(x, σ)→ T (x[σ]))
)
where
1. ucl(φ(x¯)) denotes the universal closure of φ(x¯);
2. Asn(φ, σ) represents the relation "σ is an assignment for φ", i.e., σ is a
function defined exactly on the free variables of φ;
3. x[σ] denotes the result of simultaneous substitution of numerals naming
numbers assigned by σ to the free variables of x.
Further define
D(y) := D′(y) ∧ ∀φ(x¯)
(
|FV(φ(x¯))| ≤ y −→ GC(φ(x¯))
)
where, , |FV(φx¯)| ≤ x represents the relation "φ(x¯) contains at most x free vari-
ables". For the sake of definiteness, we assume that ucl(φ) starts with a quan-
tifier binding the variable with the least index among the free variables if φ. It
can be easily seen thatD(y) is downward closed. Let us now show thatD(y) is
progressive. We work in WPT−. Fix arbitrary a and suppose that D(a). Then
D′(a) and, asD′(y) is progressive, we have alsoD′(a+1). Let us fix an arbitrary
formula φ with less than a + 1 free variables and let v be its free variable with
the least index. Then the following are equivalent
1. T (ucl(φ))
2. ∀xT (ucl(φ(x/v)))
3. ∀x∀σ
(
Asn(φ(x/v), σ)→ T (φ(x/v)[σ])
)
4. ∀σ
(
Asn(φ, σ)→ T (φ[σ])
)
.
12GC stands for ”generalised commutativity.” GC(x) expresses that the truth predicate com-
mutes with the whole block of universal quantifiers in the universal closure of x.
23
The equivalence between 1. and 2. is by the axiom for universal quantifier in
WPT−. The equivalence between 2. and 3. holds because φ(x/v) has ≤ a free
variables. The last equivalence holds because each assignment for φ consists of
an assignment to v and an assignment to the free variables of φ(x/v).
We show that WPT−+ INT proves the truth of induction onD(y). We work
inWPT−+ INT. Let us observe that for each formula φ, we have dp(φ) ≤ φ and
|FV(φ)| ≤ φ. 13 Hence if D(φ), then D′(dp(φ)) and D(|FV(φ)|). In particular,
if D(φ) then T is classically compositional on subformulae of φ and T can suc-
cessfully deal with the universal closure for φ. Let us fix an arbitrary formula
φ(v, w¯) such that D(φ(v, w¯)). We have to show T (ind(φ(v, w¯)), i.e.
T
(
ucl
(
∀v(φ(v)→ φ(v + 1)) −→
(
φ(0)→ ∀vφ(v)
)))
(1)
(we skip the reference to w¯ and assume that they are bounded by the universal
quantifiers from ucl). Since the formula
(
∀v(φ(v)→ φ(v + 1)) −→
(
φ(0)→ ∀vφ(v)
))
contains less free variables then φ(v), we know that (1) is equivalent to
∀σT
(
∀v(φ(v)[σ] → φ(v + 1)[σ]) −→
(
φ(0)[σ] → ∀vφ(v)[σ]
))
. (2)
Let us fix an arbitrary σ. Then φ(v)[σ] is a formula with at most free variable v.
Let us abbreviate it with ψ(v). Hence it is enough to show:
T
(
∀v(ψ(v)→ ψ(v + 1)) −→
(
ψ(0)→ ∀vψ(v)
))
. (3)
Since dp(ψ(v)) = dp(φ(v)) and the depth of (3) is equal to dp(ψ(v)) + 3, then
T is classically compositional on (3). Hence (3) is equivalent to
∀x
(
T (ψ(x))→ T (ψ(x+ 1))
)
−→
(
T (ψ(0))→ ∀xTψ(x)
)
which follows by INT. Hence WPT− + INT proves the truth of induction on
D.
Hence WPT−+ INT exemplifies the expressive role of truth. Let us observe
that, as it contains no restriction on arithmetical formulae admissible in the
axiom of internal induction, it is more natural than PT− + INT ↾tot.
14 WPT− +
INT proves that all arithmetical formulae, and not only total, satisfy induction,
which is clearly the idea behind PA. Let us show that despite having such an
expressive axiom, it is a model-theoretically conservative theory of truth.
13Being precise, this is a property of our coding. But most natural codings surely have it.
14In [8] authors discuss this restriction in the context of PT− and admit it is as a possible objection
to their theory.
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Theorem 34. WPT− + INT is model-theoretically conservative over PA.
Proof. LetM |= PA. For b ∈M let b ∈ Tr′ if and only if for some t0, . . . , tn such
that
M |=
∧
i≤n
Term(ti)
and some (standard!) φ(x0, . . . , xn) ∈ LPA
M |=
(
b = pφ(t0, . . . , tn)q
)
∧ φ(t0
◦, . . . , tn
◦)
Let us observe that with such a definition, we have
(M, T r′) |= UTB−
To become the appropriate interpretation ofWPT− truth predicate, Tr′ requires
only one small correction. Let∼α denote the arithmetical formula representing
in PA the relation of two sentences being the same modulo renaming variables
(α-conversion). Let us define
b ∈ Tr
if and only if for some ψ ∈ Tr′,M |= b ∼α ψ. Now it can be easily shown that
(M, T r) |= WPT− + INT.
Indeed, compositional axioms are satisfied, since for every x ∈ M such that
M |= Form≤1(x)
(M, T r) |= tot(x) if and only if for some n ∈ ω,M |= dp(x) ≤ n (∗)
and moreover (M, T r) |= UTB−. Hence in verifying compositional axioms we
may use the fact that |= is compositional. Let us check the axiom for∨. Suppose
φ = ψ ∨ θ and (M, T r) |= T (φ). Then there exists φ′ ∼α φ such that T (φ′)
and φ′ = pφ′′(t0, . . . , tn)q for some standard LPA formula φ′′(x0, . . . , xn) and
t0, . . . , tn terms in the sense of M. If so, then φ′ = ψ′ ∨ θ′ such that ψ ∼α ψ′
and θ ∼α θ′. Also ψ′ and θ′ are of the form ψ′′(t0, . . . , tn) and θ′′(t0, . . . , tn),
respectively. By UTB−, we have
M |= ψ′′(t0
◦, . . . , tn
◦) ∨ θ′′(t0
◦, . . . , tn
◦)
Without loss of generality, assume that M |= ψ′′(t0◦, . . . , tn◦). It means that
(M, T r) |= T (ψ) and consequently (M, T r) |= T (ψ) ∨ T (θ). By (∗), we have
(M, T r) |= tot(ψ) ∧ tot(θ) ∧
(
T (ψ) ∨ T (θ)
)
.
which completes the proof of one implication. Let us now assume that the
above holds. Since we have tot(ψ) and tot(φ), it follows that for some n,k,
M |= dp(ψ) ≤ n ∧ dp(θ) ≤ k.
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In particular, dp(φ) ≤ max{n, k}+ 1. Let us assume that (M, T r) |= T (ψ). Let
ψ ∼α ψ′ and θ ∼α θ′ be such that (M, T r′) |= T (ψ′). Reasoning as previously,
we conclude that (M, T r′) |= T (ψ′ ∨ φ′) and hence
(M, T r) |= T (ψ ∨ φ)
which completes the proof of the compositional axiom for ∨.
Let us now verify that (M, T r) |= INT. Fix an arbitrary formula φ(x) in the
sense ofM and assume that
(M, T r) |= T (φ(0)) ∧ ∀x
(
T (φ(x))→ T (φ(x+ 1))
)
It follows thatM |= dp(φ(x)) ≤ n for some n ∈ ω and for some standard
φ′0(x, y0, . . . , yk), φ
′
1(x, y0, . . . , yk), φ
′
2(x, y0, . . . , yk),
we have
M |= φ(x) ∼α pφ
′
i(x, t0, . . . , tk)q
for some terms in t0, . . . , tk in the sense of M and for i ≤ 2. In particular, by
UTB− we have
M |= φ′0(0, t0
◦, . . . , tk
◦) ∧ ∀x
(
φ′1(x, t0
◦, . . . , tn
◦)→ φ′2(x + 1, t0
◦, . . . , tn
◦)
)
.
But as satisfiability in a model is closed under α-conversion and each two of φ′0,
φ′1, φ
′
2 are α-equivalent, we get that
M |= φ′0(0, t0
◦, . . . , tk
◦) ∧ ∀x
(
φ′0(x, t0
◦, . . . , tn
◦)→ φ′0(x+ 1, t0
◦, . . . , tn
◦)
)
Hence, by induction inMwe get
M |= ∀x φ′0(x, t0
◦, . . . , tn
◦)
which by UTB− again gives us (M, T r′) |= ∀xT (φ′0(x, t0, . . . , tk)). Hence also
(M, T r) |= ∀x T (φ(x, t0, . . . , tk)),
which ends the proof.
In order to find a theory satisfying the Fischer-Horsten criterion, we decided
to switch the inner logic of the truth theory. It allowed to formulate a very nat-
ural theory of truth modelled after Weak Kleene Scheme. Is it possible to re-
alise Fischer-Horsten desiderata using a compositional theory of truth extend-
ing PT−? With the meaning we gave to the term ”axiomatic theory of truth”,
we are not allowed to add more symbols to the language.15 For the moment,
we leave it as an open problem.
15Without this restriction the answer is trivial: simply take PT− together with (WPT− + INT)
but formulated with a different truth predicate symbol.
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